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 BRINGING CULTURAL GENOCIDE IN BY THE BACKDOOR: 
VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE ICC 
Kristina Hon* 
I. Introduction 
Cultural genocide is the much-maligned and oft-forgotten companion of the simply-
termed concept of "genocide." Unlike genocide-a word used to characterize horrors such as 
the killings in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and, controversially, Darfur-cultural genocide 
does not require the killing of a single person.1 In fact, no physical harm need ever befall a 
victim of cultural genocide? That is because cultural genocide3 strips from humanity all manner 
of cultural contributions by human groups, through the destruction of those artifacts, documents, 
books, monuments, or even languages that embody the group's identity.4 More simply, it is 
nothing more or less than the total destruction of a culture so as to obliterate the identity of a 
*J.D. and M.A. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law and Whitehead School of Diplomacy and 
International Relations; B.A., summa cum laude, 2009, George Washington University. 
1 Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the UN Genocide Convention Include a Provision on 
Cultural Genocide or Should the Phenomenon be Encompassed in a Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y.lNT'L 
L. REv. 99, 100 (2009). 
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3 Scholars have used various other terms to descnoe the concept of cultural genocide. "Ethnocide" is the most 
frequent one; it was originally coined by Raphael Lemkin (who also coined "genocide") who considered it to be 
interchangeable with "genocide." RAPHAEL LEMK.IN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944) ("Another term 
could be used for the same idea, namely, ethnocide, consisting of the Greek word "ethnos"-nation--and the Latin 
word "cide."). However, since then, it has been interpreted to mean "the [systematic] destruction of a culture 
without the killing of its bearers," which is more along the lines of the contemporary defmition of cultural genocide. 
Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. 1. 47,67 
(2008) (quoting FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND 
CASE STUDIES 8-10 (1990)). This concept has also been directly, as well as indirectly, expressed in international 
documents. See, e.g., UNESCO Declaration of San Jose (Unesco and the struggle against ethnocide), U.N.E.S.C.O. 
Doc.FS 82/WF32 (Dec. 11, 1981) ("Ethnocide means that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and 
transmit its own culture and its own language, whether collectively or individually."). This tautological distinction 
bas no bearing on this Comment or relevant legal analysis. 
4 G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946); U.N. Secretariat, First Draft of the Genocide 
------tC~9'1'li'l'\~'emn#en, U.N. DeG. E/447 (May J:.~~www.preYeffigeaeeide.erW!a>•'niGain'efttiea/dro."'ts/. 
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people. 5 As such, a culture and identity can be destroyed "even if all the members of the group 
[are] still alive. "6 
It is, of course, an extraordinarily rare occurrence that cultural genocide happens on its 
own, without any kind of physical abuse simultaneously i.t1flicted on the victims.7 More often 
than not, cultural genocide is wrapped up in, and overshadowed by, physical violence.8 A prime 
example of this is occurring today, in Darfur, Sudan.9 The forcible displacement and 
annihilation of villages and communal societies is wrenching the three primarily-targeted tribes 
from their land, their communities, and their cultural base. 10 The Government of Sudan forces, 
in conjunction with the Janjaweed militia, have pursued a ruthless policy of "killings, rapes, 
[and] burning of villages . . . against non-Arab villagers" in "multiple attacks over a prolonged 
period of time [resulting in the destruction of the villages] by burning, shelling or bombing, 
making it impossible for the villagers to return to their villages."11 The Arab versus non-Arab 
tension fueling the conflict-and generally underpinning the government's "Arab-Islamic 
supremacist and demonizing policies"-has materialized in the violent struggle for the 
"incentives" of "[t]he property, possessions, livestock, and the cultivated land itself' of the non-
Arabs living in Darfur. 12 
5 Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 100. 
6 Id at 102 (emphasis omitted). 
7 See, e.g., Anayiostos, supra note 1 (discussion on Nazi German policies). 
8 Id 
9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN 
WESTERN SUDAN 5 VOL. 16:6(A) (May 2004) [hereinafter Darfur Destroyed]. 
10 Micol Sirkin, Comment, Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic Cleansing: A Return to Established 
Principles in Light of Contemporary Interpretations, 33 SEATTLE UNN. L. R. 489, 516-17 (20 1 0). 
11 The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Colin 
L. Powell, Sec'y of State) available at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2004-09-09-8-Text.html. 
12 JOHN HAGAN AND WENONA RYMOND-RlCHl'v:lOND, DARFUR AND THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 5 (2009). 
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Darfur, while the most recent illustration of genocide, is but one in a succession. The 
term 'genocide' was coined in 1943 by a Polish law professor, Raphael Lemkin, 13 as a 
combination of the Greek word 'genos' or 'genus' meaning race, and the Latin word 'cide' 
meaning killing (as in homicide or fratricide). 14 He used it to describe the Armenian decimation 
by the Turks during World War I, but the concept became fmnly embedded in legal and political 
terminology when he applied it to the German Nazis' policies to exterminate the Jews and the 
Roma throughout Europe during World War II. 15 Lemkin's definition of genocide was a very 
broad and holistic one, and reflective of the wide variety of destructive measures employed by 
the Nazis, encompassing the "disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, 
language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the 
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals 
belonging to such groups."16 For Lemkin, the destruction of the lives of the victims seemed 
almost an afterthought, as if taking their lives was, while cruel, a mercy in comparison to the 
annihilation unleashed on their culture, society, and identity.17 
Applying his own definition of genocide to the Nazi practices during World War II, 
Lemkin concluded that genocide had occurred 
13 Raphael Lemkin was born in the early I900s in eastern Poland, working in Poland "as a lawyer, prosecutor and 
university teacher." WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2000). In I939, he fled Poland, 
escaping the Jewish persecution, eventually settling in the United States. Id By that time, he was renowned as an 
international criminailaw scholar, and taught at universities across the U.S. ld In I943, he published his seminal 
book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, consolidating and expounding upon the legal theories behind genocide and 
exhaustively analyzing Nazi policies and practices within Germany and the occupied territories in light of 
international criminal law. Jd at 26-27. 
14 Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi; Anayiostos, supra note 1, at I 00. 
15 Anayiotos, supra note I, at 99; see Lemkin, supra note 3. 
16 Lemkin, supra note 3, at 79. 
17 Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except 
when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of life of national 
groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. 
Id 
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through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the 
captive peoples: in the political field (by destroying institutions of 
self-government and imposing a German pattern of administration, 
and through colonization by Germans); the social field (by 
disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or 
removing elements such as the intelligentsia, which provide 
spiritual leaderships-according to Hitler's statement in Mein 
.l(ampf, "the greatest of spirits can be liquidated if its bearer is 
beaten to death with a rubber truncheon"); in the cultural field (by 
prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and cultural 
activities; by substituting vocational education for education in the 
liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic thinking, which the 
occupant considers dangerous because it promotes national 
thinking); in the economic field (by shifting the wealth to Germans 
and by prohibiting the exercise of trades and occupations by people 
who do not promote Germanism "without reservations"); in the 
biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting 
procreation by Germa..'ls in the occupied countries); in the field of 
physical existence (by introducing a starvation rationing system for 
non-Germans and by mass killings, mainly of Jews, Poles, 
Slovenes, and Russians); in the religious field (by interfering with 
the activities of the Church, which in many countries provides not 
only spiritual but also national leadership); in the field of morality 
(by attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement through 
promoting pornographic publications and motion pictures, and the 
excessive consumption of alcohol). 18 
The literal translation of genocide is "the killing of a race," and of course the most 
expeditious and easiest way to achieve the physical obliteration of the very existence, the very 
foundation, of a particular group of people is by destroying the people themselves.19 That is not 
to say, however, that culture genocide doesn't happen, and hasn't happened, independent of 
physical violence.20 It is far more frequently the case, however, that cultural destruction and 
obliteration occurs within the context of an armed conflict, blurring the lines between culture, 
identity, and regular violence and extermination. Darfur is one such compelling example. When 
courts and tribunals prosecute the physical genocide, the cultural genocide is subsumed within it, 
18 Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi-xii. 
19 Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 100. 
2
° Forcible transfer of children is one such example; see infra note 33 for a historical overview. 
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and is thus punished as well.21 Yet that cannot sufficiently address the gravity of the hann being 
done, as "[t]he living may suffer cultural genocide without death," without being "vindicated by 
the prosecution of physical genocide."22 
The comparative lack of severity (potentially) of cultural genocide compared to physical 
genocide has led to the marginalization of the concept and a lack of appreciation-legal and 
societal-for the destructive effect that obliteration of a cultural identity has on its people, 
whether or not accompanied by killing?3 While cultural genocide is not a distinct crime under 
international law and is not included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), a new feature in the Statute allowing for the legal participation of qualified victims has 
the potential to inject a cultural perspective into the proceedings.24 The concept is still largely 
theoretical, but this Comment will argue that cultural genocide deserves to be recognized; it 
would therefore behoove the prosecutor and the legal representatives of the victims to pay 
special attention to the impact that a more culturally-nuanced approach would have to the 
prosecution of genocide and war crimes. This could become particularly important in the trial of 
Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, the only person as yet to be indicted by the ICC on charges 
of genocide.25 More universally, however, establishing a precedent for the inclusion of the 
cultural background of a conflict and a mechanism for addressing harms inflicted upon that 
culture is imperative because the unfortunate fact is that cultural genocide is likely to occur again 
in the future, if the past is any guide; when it does, there need to be ways to address it, directly 
and indirectly. 
21 Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 124. 
22 Jd at 125. 
23 See infra Part II.A.1 for discussion on the second justification for excluding cultural genocide from the Genocide 
Convention. 
24 See Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, art. 68, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.l83/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 
(July 17, 1998). 
25 Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, 
July 12, 2010. 
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Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of the evolution of the legal status of 
cultural genocide. Part III will discuss of how the innovative victim participation model at the 
ICC works and how it can be used to integrate evidence of cultural genocide in proving the 
specific intent required for the conviction of the crime of genocide. Part IV will apply the 
theoretical principles enumerated in the preceding section to the Omar al-Bashir case, by 
analyzing and extrapolating from the pre-trial chamber's initial refusal and the eventual grant of 
a warra11t of arrest for al-Bashir for genocide. 
II. The Evolution of Cultural Genocide 
Raphael Lemkin's comprehensive definition of genocide-encompassing harm done to 
all aspects of human life-provided the ideal starting point for the creation of a legal regime to 
identify, defme, and crirninalize genocide. 26 Despite much discussion about, and interpretations 
of, cultural genocide during the drafting sessions of the Genocide Convention, and several 
attempts to include it in the fmal version, the concept, was nevertheless excluded; since then, the 
international legal community has slowly raised the legal status of cultural genocide to its current 
role as one means of showing specific intent to commit genocide under the Genocide Convention 
and the respective statutes of the international criminal tribunals and court. 27 
A. The Genocide Convention 
The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime in Europe during the Second World War so 
shocked the conscience of the international community that the states were galvanized into 
giving them "a name and a legal defmition" so as to better come to terms with them.28 The 
newly-created United Nations General Assembly (GA) convened in 1946 and passed Resolution 
26 Lemkin, supra note 3, at 79. 
27 See infra Part II. C. I. 
28 Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 112. 
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96( 1 ), which made genocide an international crime, requested member states to pass domestic 
legislation punishing and preventing the crime, and instructed the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) to begin drafting an international convention delineating the crime.29 The committee 
of experts selected to review the preliminary document included Raphael Lemkin, and his 
influence was clearly visible in the draft, especially the first one.30 
Lemkin's definition of genocide encompassed three primary types of genocide: physical, 
biological, and cultura1.31 Physical genocide was defined as "the tangible annihilation of the 
group by killing and maiming its members," and Lemkin provided the examples, from Nazi 
policies, of racial discrimination in the distribution or rationing of food, endangering of health, 
and mass killings.32 He defined biological genocide as the "imposi[tion of] measures calculated 
to decrease the reproductive capacity of the group," including policies of separation of the sexes 
and deportation, involuntary sterilization, and undernourishment of the parents.33 Broadly 
defined, cultural genocide encompassed "attacks [beyond] the physical and/or biological 
elements of a group ... seek[ing] to eliminate its wider institutions;"34 such an elimination 
policy could be accomplished through the prohibition of the use of a local language and schools, 
the restriction or ban of artistic, literary, and cultural activities, and the destruction or 
confiscation of "national treasures, libraries, archives, musemns, artifacts, and art galleries."35 
29 G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946); Nehemiah Robinson, Appendix, The Genocide 
Convention: Its Origins and Interpretations, 40 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 315,2 (2007). 
30 Robinson, supra note 29, at 3. 
31 Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi, 82-90; Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 102. 
32 Lemkin, supra note 3, at 87-90; David Nersessian, Rethinking Cultural Genocide Under International Law, 
Human Rights Dialogue: Cultural Rights, CARNEGIE COUNCIL (Apr. 22, 2005), 
http://www .carnegiecouncil.org/resources/publications/ dialogue/2 12/section 1/513 9 .html. 
33 Lemkin, supra note 3, at 86; Nersessian, supra note 32. - -
34 Nersessian, supra note 32. 
35 Lemkin, supru note 3, at 84; Nersessian, supra note 32. 
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These three main forms of genocide also subsumed additional dimensions or "techniques" of 
genocide, including "political, social, ... economic, ... religious and moral genocide."36 
The provisions on genocide contained in the first draft that Lemkin and his colleagues 
reviewed bore a striking resemblance to the trichotomy framework Lemkin had enunciated.37 It 
made each type of genocide a separate crime, defining it and enumerating the actions that would 
be punishable under the convention.38 The crime of cultural genocide was defmed as 
[d]estroying the specific characteristics of the group by: (a) 
forcible transfer of children to another human group; or (b) forced 
and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a 
group; or (c) prohibition of the use of the national language even in 
private intercourse; or (d) systematic destruction of books printed 
in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new 
publications; or (e) systematic destruction of historical or religious 
monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or 
dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or 
religious value and of objects used in religious worship?9 
The listing of the specific criminal actions tried to incorporate, as best as possible, the various 
facets of destruction of a cultural identity, in some ways going beyond what Lemkin had 
envisioned, such as with the inclusion of forcible transfer of children.40 
After the first draft was submitted to the United Nations (U.N.) member states, and 
ECOSOC had received the states' comments and observations, a new ad hoc committee was 
formed to draft a second version of the convention.41 The resulting draft eliminated the previous 
draft's trichotomy by combining physical and biological genocide into a single article; it also 
drastically curtailed the definition of cultural genocide, excising all references to acts committed 
36 Lemkin, supra note 3, at 87-90; Kurt Mundorff, Other People's Children: A Textual and Contextual 
Interpretation of the Genocide Convention, Article 2(e), 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61,74 (2009); Nersessian, supra note 
32. 
37 Compare Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi, 82-90, with First Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4. 
38 First Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4. 
39 ld at article II(3). 
40 See generally Lemkin, supra note 3, at 84-85. 
41 Robinson, supra note 29, at 5. 
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against people, focusing strictly on the destruction of tangible items. 42 The only exception 
pertained to the use of a local or group language.43 The punishable actions, therefore, included 
only the 
prohibiti [on of] the use of the language of the group in daily 
intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of 
publications in the language of the group; [and the] destr[ uction] or 
preventi[ on of] the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical 
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and 
objects of the group.44 
The final version eventually submitted to the GA for adoption by the states parties-what 
then became the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide45-had 
entirely re-worked the breakdown of the types of genocide. The distinctions between physical, 
biological, and cultural genocide had been removed, leaving only a list of five specifically 
enumerated acts that were to be considered genocide.46 The only remnant of cultural genocide 
was the forcible transfer of children as one of the five acts, the inclusion of which had been 
proposed by the Greek delegation and approved.47 Two final attempts had been made to 
42 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Ad hoc Comm., Second Draft of the Genocide Convention, U.N. Doc E/AC.25.1-28, 
art. III (May 10, 1948), available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/drafts/. 
43 Id at art. III(l). 
44 Jd at article III. 
45 The Convention entered into force in January 1951, after the UN General Assembly adopted it on 9 October 1948. 
Schabas, sv.pra note 13, at 3; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [hereinafter 
Genocide Convention], G.A. Res. 260A(III), U.N. Doc. AIRES/260(III)A (Dec. 9, 1948). 
46 Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing seriously bodily 
or mental harm to members ofthe group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions oflife 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Genocide Convention, supra note 45, at article II. 
47 Robinson, supra note 29, at 18. The forcible removal and transfer of children-which destroys culture through the 
forced assimilation of the future generation-has a history of occurrence, having occurred in Comwellian England, 
in Australia, Canada and the United States in the nineteenth century, in Switzerland against the Roma and in the 
Soviet Union against indigenous Siberians, in the twentieth century. Mundorff, supra note 36, at 63-64; Robinson, 
supra note 29, at 18. More contemporarily, during the Cold War, Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu severely 
discriminated against and repressed ethnic Hungarians on such a scale as to constitute cultural genocide. Anayiotos, 
supra note 1, at 128. Examples of governmental policies employed included: "1. elimination of minority 
educational institutions, 2. suppression of minority languages, 3. falsification of historical data and population 
-9-
reinstate cultural genocide-in one form or another-into the Convention but neither was able to 
gamer support, and so both failed.48 The concept had been exhaustively discussed in all drafting 
sessions and the overwhelming majority of the delegates agreed that the concept was best 
"addressed elsewhere in the United Nations as a human rights issue."49 
The failure to include any substantive reference to cultural genocide did not go unnoticed 
by some delegates, and prompted statements of admonition and regret. 50 A Pakistani 
. representative lamented the exclusion of cultural genocide, protesting that the focus only on 
physical destruction of life was misplaced, because physical genocide is simply the means by 
which to achieve the end, namely "[the destruction of the] values and the very soul of a national, 
racial or religious group"-or in other words, a culture. 51 Thus, if physical genocide was to be a 
crime, so too should cultural genocide. 52 Failure to properly deter crimes against culture, 
religions, or language could lead to brazen attacks against them, which would be outside the 
scope of international criminal law. 53 
1. Justifications for the Exclusion of Cultural Genocide 
Despite such strong arguments in favor of criminalizing cultural genocide, the concept 
was left out of the Convention for five reasons. 54 The first was that the concept was simply too 
indefinite and vague. 55 While it is true that the concept encompasses a broad spectrum of crimes, 
the two definitions promulgated in the drafts of the convention would seem to be evidence that in 
statistics, 4. confiscation of cultural archives, 5. obstruction of contact with relatives abroad, and 6. dissolution of 
ethnic communities." Jd at 129. 
48 Mundorff, supra note 36, at 77. One proposal was by the Soviet Union, which was voted down and the other was 
by Venezuela, which later withdrew it. Id 
49 Schabas, supra note 13, at 73. For a more in-depth discussion, see Part II.A.1. 
50 See generally Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 114-15. 
51 !d. 
52 ld at 115. 
53 Id 
54 Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 115; Robinson, supra note 23, at 18-19; Sirkin, supra note 10, at 504. 
55 Robinson, supra note 29, at 19. 
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fact, the concept can be sufficiently concretely defmed, even if controversially.56 The second 
reason was the comparative lack of severity of the physical harm; the gap between mass murder 
and the closure of libraries was just too large. 57 This is an undeniable fact, since human life is 
not threatened by the banning of books or use of languages to the same extent as physical 
violence. The underpinnings of society, culture, and communities, however, are so threatened 
by prohibitions on books and languages, thereby lowering quality of life and weakening identity. 
The third reason was that many delegations felt that cultural destruction was best dealt 
with in "the sphere of protection of minorities" or human rights law. 58 This justification, while 
valid on its face, does not consider that it is not always the majority that oppresses the minority 
and that groups of equal strength and population might also wish to eliminate the other's culture 
in a fight for dominance and power. Also, it presupposes that cultural genocide-or cultural 
destruction-will be easier to articulate in a different area of the law. Relatedly, states felt that 
there were valid and legitimate justifications for the implementation of measures domestically to 
incorporate and assimilate minorities. 59 Indeed there are such justifiable reasons; the point, 
however, of cultural genocide is to protect groups against measures and actions that would go 
beyond the realm of the legitimate and into the realm of outright annihilation and destruction. 
That is precisely what the concept is designed to safeguard. The final reason was that 
codification of cultural genocide would be best deferred to a separate international convention, to 
allow for proper and full development of all its legal nuances. 60 This reason was undoubtedly an 
altruistic one, but a "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Cultural Genocide" has 
56 See First draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4, at art. I(I1)(3); Second draft of the Genocide 
Convention, supra note 42, at art. Ill. 
57 Robinson, supra note 29, at 19. 
58 Id 
59 Sirkin, supra note 10, at 504. 
60 Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 115. 
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never materialized; as such, the international community missed the perfect opportunity to make 
cultural genocide a definite, punishable crime under international law, leaving its status under 
international law vague and its potential unrealized. 
B. Subsequent Development of Cultural Rights 
Since then, various international treaties and declarations have incorporated references to 
cultural rights, mainly as human rights, but none have ever re-articulated the concept of cultural 
genocide. 61 For example, the International Bill of Rights-composed of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), 62 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),63 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)64-provides that human rights can be classified into five categories: civil, political, 
economic, social, and cultural.65 But of these groups, civil and political rights receive the 
greatest legal and scholarly attention; cultural, the least.66 The biggest exception to this is the 
United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), whose documents 
61 Another difference is that many of the rights can be classified as "freedom to" (or positive) rights rather than 
"freedom from" (or negative) rights, meaning that peoples are affirmatively allowed to participate and engage in 
various cultural activities, as opposed to being granted protection from governmental interference in those activities. 
Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 857, 864 (200 1) (A negative right "is a right to be 
free from government, while [a positive right] is a right to command government action."). The Genocide 
Convention enshrines "freedom from" rights. See generally Athanasios Yupsanis, The Concept and Categories of 
Cultural Rights in International Law-Their Broad Sense and the Relevant Clauses of the International Human 
Rights Treaties, 37 SYRACUSE J.lNT'L L. & COM. 207,220-24,233-34 (2010). The distinction is largely irrelevant 
for this Comment. 
62 
"Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffnmed their faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women .... " Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/217(Ill) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
63 
"Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings 
enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created 
whereby everyone can enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights ... -" 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/2200(XXI) (Mar. 
23, 1976). 
64 
"Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings 
enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone can enjoy his 
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights .... " International Covenant in 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/2200(XXI) {Jan. 3, 1976). 
65 Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 207. 
66 I d. at 208. 
- 12-
embrace a broad concept of culture, as a way of life, as a "set of distinctive spiritual, material, 
intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and ... encompass[ing], in 
addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and 
beliefs."67 Nevertheless, the UNESCO definition is not a legal definition; it is not contained in a 
document under which cultures may bring suit against their aggressors (whether domestically or 
internationally) if their social and cultural cohesion is being encroached upon.68 
The international document that comes closest to protecting against interference with, and 
destruction of, culture-the essence of cultural genocide-is the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. Articles 7 and 8 both grant affirmative rights stemming from the 
enjoyment and proliferation of a culture, and protect against ''assimilation or destruction of [that] 
culture."69 This is a progressive step but it suffers from two main drawbacks. First, the 
Declaration was created almost sixty years after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, 
meaning that any violations in the nature of those two articles committed during that time are 
essentially sheltered from prosecution. 70 Even still, as with the UNESCO declaration, there is no 
avenue for international redress. 71 Second, it applies only to the indigenous, leaving out 
67 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, U.N.E.S.C.O. Res. 25/31, Annex I, U.N. Doc. __ 
(Nov. 2, 2001). 
68 The principles in the Declaration are enumerations of positive rights. See discussion supra note 47. As they are 
much harder to enforce, the Declaration confines itself to stating that "the Member States recommend that the 
Director-General take the objectives set forth in this Action Plan into account in the implementation of UNESCO's 
programmes and communicate it to institutions of the United Nations system and to other intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations concerned with a view to enhancing the synergy of actions in favour of cultural 
diversity." UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 67, at Annex II. 
69 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, art. 7 & 8, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295/Annex (Sept. 13, 2007). "Article 7. 1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and 
mental integrity, liberty and security of person. 2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, 
peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, 
including forcibly removing children of the group to another group. Article 8. 1. Indigenous peoples and 
individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture .... " ld 
70 MALCOLMN. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 926 (6th ed. 2008) ("In the absence of contrary intention, the treaty 
will not operate retroactively so that its provisions will not bind a party as regards any facts, acts or situations prior 
to that state's acceptance of the treaty."). 
71 The Declaration confmes itself to stating that "the United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and 
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minorities. 72 Most other international documents that deal with culture either protect tangible 
items or the rights of specific groups. 73 
C. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and its Jurisprudence 
The next impetus to the international community to potentially address the absence of 
cultural genocide from any international treaty or convention was in the early 1990s, as the 
United Nations dealt with the aftermath of the wars in Yugoslavia.74 In order to provide 
accountability for the terrible crimes being committed, the U.N. Security Council established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993.75 The tribunal was 
accompanied by-and founded on-a statute by which to prosecute those accused of the crimes 
enumerated within it. 76 The statute included provisions for the punishment of grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (article 2); violations of the laws or customs of war (article 3); 
genocide (article 4); and crimes against humanity (article 5). 77 In articulating the definition of 
genocide, the statute repeats verbatim the iteration contained in the Genocide Convention. 78 
Accordingly, it does not include cultural genocide as a punishable crime. 
That did not mean, however, that cultural genocide as a concept was legally irrelevant; 
the ICTY first encountered the task of determining the legal status of cultural genocide in 
full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of this Declaration." ld at art. 
42. 
72 Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 230. The distinction is important because while the indigenous may be a minority 
within a coU11try, "minorit[ies ]" are not otherwise legally defmed under international law and are not recognized as a 
"people" and therefore are not entitled to such rights as self-determination. Jd at 230-31. 
73 Such conventions include the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention; the 2005 UNESCO Convention on 
Cultural Diversity; the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the 2003 Convention on Migrant Workers; and 
the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Anayiotos, supra note 1, 
at 115-19; Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 219. 
74 Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 119. 
75 !d. 
76 Jd at 119-20. 
77 The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993), Annex, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
78 Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 120. 
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Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstif:. 79 Krstic was charged with genocide, complicity to commit 
genocide, extermination as a cnme against humanity, murder as a cnme against humanity, 
murder as a violation of the laws of war, and persecution.80 Krstic had been a commander in the 
Bosnian Serb Army whose corps had participated in the attack on the United Nations safe area at 
Srebrenica, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys. 81 In its 260-
page judgment, the trial chamber82 was obliged to assess the meaning of the words "intent to 
destroy," proof of which is requisite for a conviction of genocide.83 After it determined that 
specific intent-or dolus specialis-was required for genocide, and not merely a "general 
awareness" of the consequences of one's actions, the chamber discussed the "manner in which 
the destruction of a group may be implemented."84 The chamber acknowledged that aside from 
physical acts, "one may also conceive of destroying a group through purposeful eradication of its 
culture and identity resulting in the eventual extinction of the group as an entity distinct from the 
remainder of the community."85 
Continuing its analysis, the trial chamber conceded that as Lemkin had originally 
conceived, genocide encompassed "all forms of destruction of a group as a distinct social 
entity."86 Such a broad interpretation of the definition resembled what had been incorporated as 
79 Id at 121. 
80 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT~98-33~T, Initial Indictment,~~ 20-30 (Oct. 30, 1998). 
81 I d. at~~ 2-12. 
82 The ICTY is composed of the following organs: three trial chambers and an appeals chamber, the prosecutor, and 
the registry. Report ofthe Secretary-General, supra note 77, at Annex art. 11. The trial chamber is charged with 
reviewing the indictments of each accused, confnm or dismiss it, issue "orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, 
surrender or transfer" of the accused, conduct the trial, render a judgment, and "impose sentences and penalties on 
Eersons convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian law." Id. at art. 19-20,23. 
3 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT~98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber),~~ 569-70 (Aug. 2, 2001). This high 
standard of intent is present in the Genocide Convention, the ICTY statute, the statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Rome Statute of the ICC. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 6; Genocide 
Convention, supra note 45, at art.2; S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Report of 
the Secretary-General, supra note 77, at Annex art. 4. 
84 Krstic (trial chamber judgment) at~~ 571, 574. 
85 I d. at~ 574. 
86 Id at~ 575. 
a crime against humanity into the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal established following 
World War II. 87 This was then later subsumed into the ICTY statute (and even later into the 
Rome Statute forming the ICC), as persecution under the category of crime against humanity.88 
Nevertheless, and despite other developments in international law,89 the trial chamber 
stayed within the conservative parameters of the language in the statute and limited the definition 
of genocide to those physical and biological acts that cause the destruction of a group--those 
five specifically enumerated in its statute, as taken from the Genocide Convention.90 ''Hence, an 
enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to 
annihilate those elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the 
community would not fall under the definition of genocide."91 
1. Cultural Genocide as Proof of Specific Intent 
The chamber did recognize, however, that very often, physical and biological attacks are 
accompanied by destruction of "cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted 
group," in an effort to obliterate all evidence of that group's identity.92 As such, those types of 
acts-if substantiated by the evidence-may well be considered as part of the proof of the 
specific intent to destroy (physically) that group.93 Indeed, that is what the trial chamber did; in 
87 ld. At Nuremberg, the United States Military Tribunal had interpreted persecution in the Ulrich Greifelt eta!. 
case broadly, to cover extermination of the characteristics of ethnic and national groups. !d. at ~ 575. "The acts, 
conduct, plans and enterprises . . . were carried out as part of a systematic progra111 of genocide, aimed at the 
destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups, in part by murderous extermination, and in part by elimination and 
suppression of national characteristics." Jd. (quoting U.S.A. v. Ulrich Greifelt et al., TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS, 
VOL. XIV (1948)). 
88 Krstic (trial chamber judgment) at~ 575. 
89 Such developments include a U.N. General Assembly resolution and a decision by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. ld at~~ 578-79. A judicial opinion by a domestic court is not generally considered as a 
source of international law. See generally Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, U.N. Charter Annex. 
9
° Krstic (trial chamber judgment) at~ 580. 
91 ld. 
92 ld. 
93 ld 
- 16-
fmding Krstic guilty of genocide, it considered as evidence of the requisite specific intent ''the 
deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to" the Bosnian Muslims.94 
The Appeal Chamber's Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen supported the proposition the 
trial chamber enumerated in its judgment against Krstic-that evidence of cultural genocide or 
destruction can be used to supplement a fmding of specific intent.95 In his partial dissenting 
opinion appended to the chamber's judgment of the Krstic case, Judge Shahabuddeen articulated 
a more nuanced version of cultural genocide.96 He recognized that cultural genocide was 
intentionally left out of the Genocide Convention, but stated that 
if those characteristics [-{)ften intangible-that 'bind ... together 
a collection of people as a social unit'] have been destroyed in 
pursuance of the intent with which a listed act of a physical or 
biological nature was done, it is not convincing to say that the 
destruction, though effectively obliterating the group, is not 
genocide because the obliteration was not physical or biological.97 
The crime of genocide "is a crime against human groups," "not a crime against individuals."98 
As such, if acts taken to destroy the tangible and intangible characteristics of such a human 
group effectively lead to its destruction, it should be no defense against a charge of genocide that 
the specific acts committed were not those specifically listed as physical or biological in the 
ICTY Statute or the Genocide Convention.99 The genocidal intent must always be to destroy the 
group; but evidence of such intent should not be-and historically is not-limited to physical or 
94 Id 
95 Krstic' s conviction of genocide was replaced by a conviction of aiding and abetting the commission of genocide, 
based on a fmding by the Appeals Chamber of a lack of specific intent, but the legal principles enumerated by the 
trial chamber as regards evidence of cultural destruction as one indication of such intent remained unchanged. 
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Appeals Chamber),~~ 2506, 134, 144 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
96 Jd (partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahahbuddeen); William A. Schabas, Genocide Law in a Time of 
Transition: Recent Developments in the Law of Genocide, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 161, 171-72 (2008). 
97 Jd at~ 50 (partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). 
98 Id 
99 Jd 
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biological acts.100 Therefore, acts of cultural destruction should be weighted as heavily the 
physical and biological ones in determining, as well as constituting, genocide. 
ICTY chambers adjudicating other genocide cases have interpreted Judge 
Shahabuddeen's dissent to support an expansion of the deflnition of genocide in the grey areas, 
where ethnic hatred-and resulting cultural crimes-is rampant but there is little evidence that 
actual physical destruction of the people was intended. 101 "The destruction of the culture may 
serve evidentially to confirm an intent, to be gathered from other circumstances, to destroy the 
group, as such," without any manifestation of physical violence. 102 
The trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Blagojevic adopted the dichotomy between requiring 
the criminal acts to be physical or biological, but allowing the intent to take other forms 
enumerated by Judge Shahabuddeen.103 The chamber recognized, as Judge Shahabuddeen had 
made clear, that while the ''listed acts of genocide" must be physical or biological in nature, "the 
same is not required for the intent."104 The intent need not be limited to inferences from physical 
and biological acts; cultural acts may be considered, since a group whose destruction is intended 
"is comprised [not only] of its individuals, but also of its history, traditions, the relationship 
between its members, the relationship -vvith other groups, [and] the relationship -vvith the land."105 
Accordingly, the Blagojevich court recognized that forcible transfer (exceeding "mere 
displacement") can be genocide if "the consequence is dissolution of the group."106 Forced 
100 ld at~ 51. 
101 Schabas, supra note 96, at 172. 
102 Krstic (Appeals chamber judgment, partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen) at~ 53. 
103 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment,~ 659 (Jan. 17, 2005). Blagojevic was charged with 
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war. Prosecutor v. 
Blagojevich, Case No. IT-02-53-PT, Initial Joinder Indictment (Jan. 22, 2002). He was in command of one of the 
brigades in charge of securing the "safe area" of Srebrenica, "and directly participated in the actual capture" of the 
area and resulting executions. Jd at~ 1. 
104 Blagojevic Gudgment) at~ 659. 
105 Id at~ 666. 
106 Jd at~ 660. 
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migration of civilians and large-scale deportation would also fall under the same category.107 
Rape and other acts of sexual violence, as acknowledged by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), are also evidence used to show intent to destroy. 108 
The chamber also looked favorably upon a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany, 109 which "found that [expanding the interpretation of Germany's statutory 
definition of genocide beyond physical and biological extermination] would not be in violation 
of international law and 'that it has generally been accepted that the limit of the meaning of the 
text has been exceeded only when the intention to destroy relates solely to a group's cultural 
identity,"' that is, cultural genocide.110 While the ICTY in its jurisprudence has not extended the 
statutory interpretation of genocide to cultural genocide, the premise behind such an expansion 
was further expounded in Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, 111 as it dissected some of the philosophy 
behind the actus reus/mens rea dichotomy: 
107 ld at~ 663. 
108 ld at~ 662. 
It is not accurate to speak of 'the group' as being amenable to 
physical or biological destruction. Its members are, of course, 
physical or biological beings, but the bonds among its members, as 
well as such aspects of the group as its members' culture and 
beliefs, are neither physical nor biological. Hence [under] the 
Genocide Convention's 'intent to destroy' the group cannot 
sensibly be regarded as reducible to an intent to destroy the group 
physically or biologically .... 112 
109 Prosecutor v. Nikola Jorgic, Judgement, Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1290/00 (Dec. 12, 2000). 
110 Blagojevich Gudgment) at ~ 664 (emphasis added). The German court upheld an interpretation of "destroy" to 
mean "the destruction of ~the group as a social unit in its specificity, uniqueness and feeling of belonging [and that] 
the biological-physical destruction of the group is not required.'" Jd 
111 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment~ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006). Krajisnik was charged with 
genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Amended Indictment (Mar. 21, 2000). With the goal 
of freeing Bosnia from unwanted Serbs, Krajisnik engaged in ~~e creation of impossible conditions of life, 
involving persecution and terror tactics; ... deportation of those who were reluctant to leave; and the liquidation of 
others." ld at~ 6. 
112 Krajisnik Gudgmcnt) nt ~ 854 n.l701. 
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Nevertheless, the court declined to extend genocide beyond the physical and biological acts 
listed in the ICTY Statute.113 
2. Additional Cultural Provisions in the ICTY Statute 
Aside from article 4 of the ICTY statute which deals with genocide, articles 2 and 3-on 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the laws of war, respectively-
allow for the prosecution of crimes against property, potentially encompassing cultural property, 
including: "extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" from article 2( d); "wanton destruction of 
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity" from article 3(b ); 
"seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and 
education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science" from article 
3(d); and fmally "plunder of public or private property" from article 3(e). 114 
But none of these four provisions provides for any kind of protection against destruction 
of culture through means other than the destruction of tangible objects. Yet culture, as the 
cumulative sense of identity that is built through both its embodiment in physical objects, as well 
as intangible ephemera, can be threatened through other means. There is no comparable 
criminalization of acts such as the prohibition of the use of local and native languages and 
forcible displacement. 115 
113 See generally id at, 854, as a general statement of the legal use of other types of proof of intent, including, for 
example the transfer of chlldren, severing of bonds among group members, and deliberate forcible transfer. 
114 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 77, at Annex. 
115 Deportation is made criminal as a breach of the Geneva Conventions under article 2(g)-''unlawful deportation 
or transfer or unlawful confmement of a civilian-and as a crime against humanity under article 5( d)-
"deportation." ld 
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Such types of activities are also legally considered to be components of the concept of 
ethnic cleansing.116 One part of the problem with such a characterization is that there is no 
formal legal definition, although a U.N. Commission of Experts (investigating the atrocities in 
Yugoslavia) defmed it as a "purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to 
remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or 
religious group from certain geographic areas .... This purpose appears to be the occupation of 
territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups."117 
The second part of the problem is that under the development of international tribunals' 
jurisprudence, ethnic cleansing is recognized neither as a stand-alone genocidal policy nor as a 
crime unto itself. 118 Interpretation of the word "to destroy" in the definition of genocide 
"excludes" cultural genocide because destruction of a culture does not physically destroy the 
victims; by extension, ethnic cleansing, which also does not destroy the people-at least, that is 
not the main intent, which is displacement-is equally precluded from falling under the crime of 
genocide. 119 Ethnic cleansing has only been acknowledged as evidence of genocidal intent (like 
cultural genocide), meaning that barring the additional commission of an enumerated crime in 
the Genocide Convention (or ICTY Statute or Rome Statute), a state policy of ethnic cleansing is 
not genocide. 120 In the same vein, the acts committed under a policy of ethnic cleansing are not 
punishable as one coherent crime; rather, each act is prosecuted on an individual basis either as a 
war crime or crime against humanity under the various provisions of the international criminal 
116 Sirkin, supra note 10, at 500. 
117 Rep. of the U.N. Comm'n of Experts Established Pursuant to S.C. Res. 780 (1992), §III, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 
(May 27, 1994), available at http://www.his.com/~twarrick/commxyul.htm. 
118 See Sirkin, supra note 10, at 489-91. 
119 Jd at 502. 
120 Jd at 500, 506. 
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statutes.121 This is all notwithstanding the fact that the U.N. GA passed a resolution back in 1992 
making ethnic cleansing a form of genocide. 122 
In its jurisprudence, the ICTY helped to resurrect what seemed to be the legally moribund 
concept of cultural genocide. 123 It essentially carved a niche for it; while restricting the acts that 
could be considered genocide to the five enumerated in its statute, it developed the manner in 
which the specific intent behind genocide could be proved to include other physical and cultural 
acts and motivations not explicitly stated in the statute. 124 
D. The International Criminal Court 
The 1990s thus saw a huge "dynamism" in, or development of, international criminal 
law, due to the jurisprudence produced by the international criminal tribunals established to 
adjudicate the crimes committed during the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 125 These events 
also led to a newfound recognition of a need to create a permanent international institution 
through which to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes-the creation of which had been 
stalled for the previous fifty years, despite numerous inclinations to act upon it. 126 Finally doing 
so, the U.N. GA convened the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, in Rome, Italy in June 1998.127 
121 Jd at 500 ("International courts and tribunals commonly criminalize ethnic cleansing under the crime of 
deportation or forcible transfer or the crime of persecution-both crimes against humanity."). 
122 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 11578-79 (Aug. 2, 2001); G.A. Res. 
47/121, U.N. Doc. AG/RES/47/121 (Dec. 18, 1992). GA resolutions are not law; they are only evidence ofwhatthe 
international community believes is law. S~aw, supra note 70, at 88. The only way international tribunals may get 
around the strict parameters of their statutes is by fmding, for example, that cultural genocide or ethnic cleansing has 
become criminalized under customary international law by showing widespread conformance of state practice and 
opinio juris, or belief by the states that it is law. See generally id at 76-89. 
123 See supra Part II. C. 
124 See generally Krstic (trial chamber judgment), Case No. IT-98-33-T. 
125 Schabas, supra note 96, at 162. 
126 For example, in 1989, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago suggested that the international illegal drug 
trade be dealt with by the establishment of a permanent international tribunal. See Schabas, supra note 13, at 90. 
127 Sonali B. Shah, The Oversight of the Last Great International institution of the Twentieth Century: The 
International Criminal Court's Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 351, 372 (2002). 
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One of the issues that needed to be addressed was whether the statute of this new court-
called the Rome Statute-would adopt verbatim the definition of genocide contained in the 
Genocide Convention or whether the defmition would be expanded to incorporate the newly-
emerging jurisprudence and analysis from the criminal tribunals. 128 Rather than engage in the 
same divisive debates over the expansion of the definition that had so plagued the committees 
drafting the Genocide Convention, the delegates "resist[ ed] the temptation to add new 
categories" and decided to use the same language as in the Convention.129 The only country to 
suggest incorporating new components into the definition was Cuba, and its proposal received 
little support.130 Thus the international community had an auspicious opportunity on which it 
failed to capitalize to remedy the deficiencies in the definition (and prosecution) of genocide by 
including the concepts of cultural genocide and ethnic cleansing-even though its motivation 
was strategic. The provisions for the punishment of genocide contained in the Rome Statute, 
which created the ICC, therefore, are identical to those contained in the Genocide Convention 
and the statute for the ICTY -excluding cultural genocide once again.131 
The Rome Statute does, however, take from the ICTY statute its provision on the 
illegality of the seizures of, and destruction or damage to, cultural institutions.132 It incorporates 
as a war crime, in the context of both an international and non-international armed conflict, 
attacking protected objects.133 Those objects are "buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science or charitable purposes, [and] historical monuments."134 In addition to this second-best 
128 Jd. at 376 n.l36; Schabas, supra note 96101, at 162. 
129 Shah, supra note 127, at 377 (quoting Press Release, Preparatory Committee for Establishment of International 
Criminal Court Discusses Defmitions of"Genocide," "Crimes Against Humanity," U.N. Press Release L/2762 (Mar. 
26, 1996)). 
130 Schabas, supra note 96101, at 162. 
131 See Rome Statute, supra note 24, art. 6. 
132 See id. at art. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv). 
133 ld. 
134 ld Tht: t.:r.irnt: abo iudw.lt::s "hosp.itab or plat.:t::s wht:rt: tht: :sit.:k ami wow1Ut:U art: t.:ollt:t.:t~;:J." ld. 
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option, presumably the ICC will adopt the principle of using cultural destruction as evidence of 
the specific intent necessary for genocide once it has reached the point in its jurisprudential 
development when it is confronted with a defendant charged with genocide. 135 Sudanese 
president Omar al-Basbir is currently the only person thus far that the ICC has indicted for 
genocide, but he remains at large. 136 
Despite a promising beginning for cultural genocide, incorporation of the concept has 
been withheld from international criminal conventions and statutes.137 It has made piece-meal 
appearances in international jurisprudence, but while its exclusion has been bemoaned by some, 
it has consistently been relegated to the sidelines. Nevertheless, the ICC birthed a new theory of 
legal participation, allowing for victims of the crimes committed by ICC-accused to be 
represented before the court. 138 This radical mechanism has the potential to influence the way 
cultural destruction is treated in international criminallaw. 139 The ICC will soon face the task of 
analyzing its own interpretation of genocide during which time it will undoubtedly rely heavily 
on previous interpretations by the ICTY. 140 Until then, or until the Rome Statute is amended by 
the states parties141 to include a separate provision for the prosecution of cultural genocide-
which would be a most welcome and desirable event-there is another, more subtle way by 
which cultural considerations should be presented to the court: by the certification of both natural 
135 Within international law, there is no hierarchy of courts and so the ICC need not, but may if it so chooses, accept 
the rather well-established principle that attacks on, and destruction of, culture may substantiate a fmding of specific 
intent. Shaw, supra note 70, at 123, 1116. 
136 See, e.g., Sudan's Omar al-Bashir in Malawi: ICC wants answers, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15384163. 
137 See Genocide Convention, supra note 45; Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 77; Rome Statute, supra 
note 24. 
138 See Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at article 68(3). 
139 Gioia Greco, Victims' Rights Overvi~ Under the ICC Legal Framework: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 7 INT'L 
CRIM. L. REv. 531, 533 (2007) ("[Victims'] involvement in trials and cooperation in the pursuit of criminal 
prosecution advanced ... the application of international criminal law."). 
140 Amal Alamuddin, Collection of Evidence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
235-36 (Karim A.A. Khan et al. ed., 201 0). 
141 Amendments may be proposed by any state party to the Statute. ld at art. 121 ("After the expiry of seven years 
from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto."). 
-24-
persons and cultural institutions as official victims of the various conflict situations under the 
purview of the ICC. The ICC would be well-served by letting the victims carve a niche for 
themselves by presenting to the court the cultural context of the conflicts and crimes. 
III. The Novel Approach to Victim Participation 
The Rome Statute of the ICC contains a new and revolutionary provision that allows for 
victims to participate in a legal capacity-not merely as witnesses or receivers of reparations-in 
most stages of the accountability process, from the investigation stage through to the trial 
itself. 142 Neither the ICTY nor the sister tribunal set up for Rwanda provide for a similar 
participatory-rights scheme.143 One of the main justifications for this novel institution is that the 
overwhelming function of the ICC is truth-finding, and victims, having experienced first-hand 
the crimes at issue, are in a good position to accomplish that. 144 Granting them a larger 
participatory role also ensures that the ICC will address their concerns-not only for 
accountability but also for justice (both communal and individual) and reconciliation.145 As with 
much at the ICC, one of the drawbacks of this scheme is that the jurisprudence assessing and 
analyzing the boundaries, scope, and modalities of victim participation is still in development 
and therefore quite fluid (as well as vague and contradictory). 146 
A. Modes of Participation 
The Rome Statute provides primarily for two avenues of participatory rights: (1) a very 
narrow and specific route based on articles 15(3) and 19, that strictly delineates what role victims 
142 I d.; Miriam Cohen, Victims' Participation Rights Within the International Criminal Court: A Critical Overview, 
37 DENV. J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 3, 351 (2009). 
143 Cohen, supra note 142, at 352. Some civil law systems, however, mainly in Europe, do allow for activie 
participation by the victims. I d. at 352 n.11. 
144 Id. at 351, 353. 
145 I d. at 353. 
146 ld 
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may play in initiating investigations and challenging jurisdiction and admissibility, 147 
respectively; and (2) a much broader (and therefore more ambiguous) route founded on article 
68(3) which allows victims to generally participate in "proceedings."148 
1. Narrow Preliminary Rights 
Article 15 allows "victims [to] make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber" (PTC)149 
when the prosecutor has decided that he has sufficient evidence to request an authorization of an 
investigation from the PTC.150 In that way, the victims may help to support the prosecutor's case 
before the chamber, as the chambers makes a determination as to whether "there is a reasonable 
basis" that the case "fall[s] within the jurisdiction of the court" and that therefore an 
investigation into the alleged crimes would be substantiated. 151 Aside from receiving 
authorization from the PTC, the prosecutor "may initiate investigations proprio motu152 on the 
basis of information," information which may be provided by various victims' organizations and 
non-governmental organizations, thus "triggering" the investigation. 153 Direct victim 
participation may also put some pressure on the prosecutor to begin an investigation even if it is 
within the prosecutor's discretion whether to proceed-or at least begin making preliminary 
147 The concept of admissibility refers to whether the ICC may hear the case in the first place. The court must 
decliile cases that are ''being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry" it out; Hthe case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned;" ''the person concerned has already been tried for 
conduct which is the subject of the complaint;" and "the case is not of sufficient gravity." Rome Statute, supra note 
24, at art. 17(1). 
148 Cohen, supra note 142, at 353, 358, 360. 
149 The court is composed of: the presidency; the appeals division, the trial division, and the pre-trial division; the 
office of the prosecutor; and the registry. Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 34. The pre-trial chambers are 
tasked with, inter alia, evaluating the legal and evidentiary requirements-a "reasonable basis"-for initiating an 
investigation; take preliminary steps to "ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings" and ''protect the 
rights of the defence;" issuing warrants and summonses; protect the privacy and security of victims and witnesses, 
preserve evidence, protected those arrested, and protect national securi1y information. Jd at art. 53, 56-58. 
150 Id at art. 15(3). 
151 ld. at art. 15(4). 
152 On one's own initiative. Proprio Motu, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/proprio+motu 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2012). · 
153 Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 15(1); Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation in the 
Proceedings of the International Criminal Court, 90 INT'L REv. OF THE RED CROSS 870,427 (2008). 
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inquiries. 154 Having such roles is very important for the victims because they will be able to gain 
access to all public information about the conflict at issue from a very early stage in the 
proceedings, as well as be able to add to the accumulation of information, which will be to the 
benefit of the prosecutor. 155 
Article 19 allows for victims who have already engaged with the court in some legal 
capacity to raise questions of jurisdiction or admissibility to the PTC.156 There are two principal 
restrictions to this right of participation. The first is that it is only available to those victims who 
have "already communicated with the Court in relation to the case," precluding new 
participants. 157 The second is that it can only be exercised within a case, and not merely a 
situation.158 This distinction between a situation and a case-extrapolated from the structure of 
the Rome Statute-is very important, as it features heavily in the nature of proceedings at the 
ICC and often determines the extent of victim participation at a particular stage of a trial. 159 The 
difference between a 'situation' and a 'case' is that a situation is defmed by "temporal, territorial 
and personal parameters" and is the proceeding by which a determination is made as to "whether 
the facts alleged should give rise to a criminal investigation."160 More colloquially, it is the 
investigation into an event, incident, or spate of violence during which time the prosecutor 
determines who, if anyone, bears responsibility for international criminal law violations 
154 Baumgartner, supra note 153, at 427. 
155 Cohen, supra note 142, at 358. 
156 Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 19(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, ICC~ASP/113, Sept. 3-10 2002, Rule 59. 
157 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 156, at rule 59. 
158 Cohen, supra note 142, at 3 61. 
159 Baumgartner, supra note 153, at 414; See, e.g., Prosecution's Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Application for 
Participation of Applicants a/0 106/06 to a/0 110/06, a/0 128/06 to a/0 162/06, a/0 188/06, a/0 199/06, a/0203/06, 
a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06 and a/0224/06 to a/0250/06 (Pre~ Trial Chamber I), No. ICC~Ol/04~ 
346, June 25, 2007 (the Prosecutor makes a distinction between ''situation victims" and "case victims"). 
160 Greco, supra note 139, at 537 n.30. 
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committed.161 The end result is the filing of a request for a warrant of arrest (or summons to 
appear) with a pre-trial chamber charging the alleged perpetrators with crimes under the Rome 
Statute. 162 A case, on the other hand, refers to the adjudication of "specific incidents ... among 
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court" "with one or more specific suspects occurring 
within a situation under investigation," which follows ''the issuance of an arrest warrant or a 
summons to appear."163 In essence, the full spectrum of a trial of an accused, from indictment to 
final judgment on the merits. 
2. Broad Rights in a Situation and Case 
The broader rights that victims have under the Rome Statute, while seemingly explicit, 
are much less straight-forward and are therefore more open to interpretation. 164 There are more 
requirements for participation and distinctions exist between who qualifies to participate in a 
situation and a case. 165 But the modes of participation are much greater once these qualifications 
are met, increasing the role that victims may play. 
1. Statutory Criteria for Participation 
Article 68(3), along with Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, provide the 
participatory framework by which the legal rights of victims are granted for the various 
proceedings within a situation and a case. 166 It is this portion of the victim participation 
mechanism that is the most fluid, as the pre-trial chambers struggle to articulate a coherent set of 
standards and tests for admitting qualified victims and delineating their modes of participation. 
161 Baumgartner, supra note 153, at 414. 
162 Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 58. 
163 B 3 aumgartner, supra note 15 , at 414; Greco, supra note 139, at 537 n.31. 
164 See Cohen, supra note 142, at 365-65. 
165 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 68(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 156, at 
Rule 85. 
166 Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 68(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 156, at Rule 85. 
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Based on the strict language of Rule 85(a), PTC I, in its first decision regarding victim 
participation, enumerated the four requirements a victim must satisfy to gain the legal right to 
participate: the victim must be (1) a natural person; (2) who has suffered harm; (3) resulting from 
a crime under the jurisdiction of the court; and (4) there must be a causal link between the 
alleged crime and the harm. 167 
Subsequent decisions by the pre-trial chambers and the appeals chamber have provided 
more specific guidelines for these criteria.168 As regards the first criterion, Single Judge 
Kuenyehia in PTC I, overseeing the Darfur situation, determined that a deceased person is not a 
"natural person" within the meaning of Rule 85. 169 Therefore victims may only file on behalf of 
themselves as natural persons, as well as on behalf of minors, the disabled, and any individual 
who has given his or her consent (such a situation usually arises when the person is still in a 
conflict zone and is unable to file on his or her own behalf). 170 Regarding the second criterion, 
the harm suffered by the person seeking victim status may be material (or economic), physical, 
and/or emotional (or psychological). 171 So long as the individual suffered personally, he or she 
qualifies, regardless of whether the suffering was direct or indirect. 172 
167 Decision on the Applications for the Participation of the Proceedings ofVPRS I, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, 
VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber I),~ 79, No. ICC-01104-101-tEN-Corr, Jan. 17, 2006; Rules ofProcedure 
and Evidence, supra note 156, at Rule 85(a); Cohen, supra note 142, at 367. 
168 See generally Cohen, supra note 142, at 366-70. 
169 Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to 
a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Single Judge)~ 36, 
No. ICC-02/05-111-Corr, Dec. 14, 2007; Cohen, supra note 142, at 368. 
170 See generally Standard Application Form to Participate in Proceedings Before the International Criminal Court 
for Individual Victims and Persons Acting on Their Behalf [hereinafter Old application fonn]; Application Fonn for 
Individuals: Request for Participation in Proceedings and Reparations at the ICC for Individual Victims [hereinafter 
New application form]. 
171 Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to 
a/0015/06, a/0021107, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and a/0035107 to a/0038/07, No. ICC-02/05-111-Corr ~~ 30, 38-50; 
Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defense against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' 
Participation of 18 January 2008 (Appeals Chamber),~ 1, No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, July 11,2008. 
172 Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defense against Trial Chamber I 's Decision on Victims' 
Participation of 18 January 2008, No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432 at~~ 38-39. The distinction between direct and 
indirect hann comes into play when "harm suffered by one victim as a result of the commission of a crime within 
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The criteria necessary to qualify as an institutional victim under Rule 85(b) are virtually 
identical to those required for individuals, save that the victim must be an organization or 
institution, the property of which is "dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable 
purposes," or is a "historic monument ... , hospital ... or other place ... and object ... for 
humanitarian purposes."173 The only difference-and it is a significant one-is that as regards 
the harm criterion, an institution or organization must suffer direct harm; the institution or 
organization cannot become a victim through indirect harm. 174 In addition, the .person filing on 
behalf of such an institution or organization must submit documents sufficient to establish locus 
standi (standing) to act on that institution's behalf. 175 The court will consider any document in 
accordance with the domestic law of the country in question for proof of the legal status of the 
institution, and of the applicant's own standing within the institution in determining whether to 
allow the individual to file on its behalf 176 Thus the requirements for obtaining victim status as 
an institution or organization are slightly more onerous than those for an individual, given that 
the harm suffered by the property must be direct and that the person who is filing must legally be 
able to do so under the laws ofhis or her own country. 177 
the jurisdiction of the Court ... give[s] rise to harm suffered by other victims." Id at~ 32. The court gives the 
example of the child soldier: the child suffers directly and his parents suffer indirectly; both would qualify as victims 
in the ICC (so long as they met the other requirements). !d. 
173 Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the Investigation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Single Judge),~ 140, No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, 
Jan. 31, 2008; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 156, at Rule 85(b). 
174 Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the Investigation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, at~ 141; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 156, at Rule 85(b). 
175 Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the Investigation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, at, 142. 
176 Fourth Decision on Victims' Participation (Pre-Trial Chamber III, Single Judge),, 53, No. ICC-01/05-01/08-
320, Dec. 12, 2008. 
177 See id 
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The provision allowing for institutions and organizations to qualify as victims in order to 
be legally represented before the court is heavily under-utilized. 178 What is particularly curious 
and useful about the definition that qualifies what kinds of institutions may be granted status is 
that the language mirrors, almost precisely, that contained in the article on the war crime of 
attacking protected objects.179 Thus, there is enormous potential for a wide array of cultural 
institutions to be able to promote their interests before the court-not just for reparations180 but 
also with regard to their purposeful destruction. To date, however, only two institutions have 
availed themselves of this mechanism. In the first, a headmaster filed on behalf of his destroyed 
school, in the situation ofthe Democratic Republic of the Congo. 181 His application was granted, 
as the court determined that his application met all of the Rule 85(b) requirements and was 
properly substantiated by legal documents showing standing.182 In the second, a priest filed on 
behalf of his destroyed church, in the Bemba case in the Central African Republic situation.183 
His application was denied because he had filled out the application form incorrectly-he had 
filed on behalf of himself and the institution on the same form-and he had also failed to provide 
sufficient documentation of his legal standing.184 
Aside from meeting the objective criteria of a victim, there is one final requirement that 
both a human victim and an institutional victim must meet. 185 In order to participate in 
178 Only two institutions have thus far filed for status. See generally THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC COUNSEL FOR 
VICTIMS, REPRESENTING VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A MANUAL FOR LEGAL 
REPRESENTATIVES 50 [hereinafter OPCV Manual] (2011). 
179 See Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 8(b)(2)(ix); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 156, at Rule 
85(b). 
180 This Comment will not address the question of reparations. 
181 OPCV Manual, supra note 178, at 50. 
182 See Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the 
Investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, at~~ 139-143. 
183 OPCV Manual, supra note 178, at 50. 
184 See Fourth Decision on Victims, No. ICC-01/05-01/08-320, at~~ 53-56. 
185 Cohen, supra note 142, at 368. 
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proceedings, the "personal interests" of that victim must be affected. 186 The interpretation of this 
phrase has caused some controversy. 187 The ICC chambers have interpreted it to require a 
reassessment of personal interest for every new proceeding in which a victim wishes to 
participate; this is separate and distinct from "the entire proceedings," or the trial itself 188 
Obviously, this means that in some types of proceedings-largely procedural-victims' requests 
to participate will be denied because the personal interests will be too tenuous.189 Recent 
jurisprudence has in fact established that, contrary to previous decisions by the three pre-trial 
chambers, a victim does not have a general procedural status of victim in the situation, or 
investigation, phase. 190 This, however, does not preclude victims from petitioning to participate 
in each individual proceeding taking place within the investigative phase. 191 But it does require 
them to restate their personal interests in the specific proceeding in which they would like to 
participate; once they qualify, the victims are not automatically allowed to participate in every 
proceeding brought before the chamber in the situation. 192 
Participation in a case, on the other hand, is not so rigid. Once the prosecutor files 
charges, the chamber reassesses the victims who have already been accepted into the situation 
phase to determine whether they fulfill the additional requirement for participation in a case.193 
186 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 156, at Rule 68(3). 
187 Compare Decision sur les demandes de participation ala procedure de VPRSI, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, 
VPRS 5 et VPRS 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No.ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Jan. 17,2006, with Decision on victims' 
participation in proceedings relating to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Pre-Trial Chamber I), 
No. ICC-01/04-593, Apr. 11,2011. 
188 Cohen, supra note 142, at 368. 
189 Jd 
190 See Decision on Victims' Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Pre-
Trial Chamber II), No.ICC-01/09-24, 3 November 2010; Decision on victims' participation in proceedings relating 
to the situation in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-593, Apr. 11,2011. 
191 Jd at~ 9 (emphasis added). 
192 See generally Decision on Victims' Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, No.ICC-01/04-593. 
193 Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings Submitted by VPRS I to VPRS 6 in the Case 
of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Pre-Trial Chamber I), pg. 6/9 No. ICC-01/04-01/06-172-tEN, June 29, 
2006. 
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That requirement is that there be a "sufficient causal link between the harm they have suffered 
and the crimes for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that [the accused] bears 
criminal responsibility."194 For new applications, the prospective victim must meet all of the 
objective criteria from Rule 85(a) or (b), allege sufficient personal interest, and establish a 
sufficient causal link between the harm and the crimes for which the accused was indicted.195 
Once a person has been granted victim status in a case, that status is permanent for the entire 
duration .of the trial, as the trial itself is considered a proceeding.196 The person need not 
resubmit a reassessment of personal interest for each phase or proceeding within the trial. 
n. Participatory Rights 
In addition to the more restricted right to participate in the prosecution process such as in 
initiating investigations and challenging jurisdiction and admissibility, there are various other 
ways by which, and various other proceedings in which, victims may participate.197 One such 
proceeding is the confirmation of charges hearing.198 Once the accused is brought before the 
court, the charges against him must be confirmed so that the trial may begin.199 In the case 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga,200 the first before the ICC, the victims' legal representatives 
were allowed to give opening and closing statements, although they were limited to making only 
194 ld 
195 See generally id 
196 Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against 
the decision of the Pre~ Trial Chamber I of? December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Pre~ Trial Chamber I of24 December 2007, ~ 45, No. ICC-01/04~556, Dec. 19,2008, (a 
"proceeding" is ~~a term denoting a judicial cause pending before a Chamber."). 
197 See Baumgartner, supra note 153, at 425-30. 
198 I d. at 428. 
199 Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 61. 
200 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was the alleged commander-in-chief of the UPC and FPLC militia forces in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, from September 2002 until at least the end of 2003. Democratic Republic of 
Congo--JCC-01/04-01/06 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, INT'L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus!ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ ICC+O 1 04/Related+Cases/ICC+O 1 04+0 1 06/Democr 
atic+Republic+of+the+Congo.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). He is charged with the war crimes of "enlisting and 
conscripting of children under the age of 15 into the [FPLC] and using them to participate actively in hostilities" in 
an international armed conflict and non-inten1ational rumed conflict. I d. 
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legal observations and not presenting facts or personal statements.201 The same four Lubanga 
victims who participated in the confirmation of charges hearing ·were, during the actual trial 
phase, "allowed to present their view in written and oral form with regard to all the procedural 
and substantive issues that arose."202 
One of the principal decisions203 handed down on victim participation also states that 
victims may present and examine evidence; ask appropriate questions whenever the evidence 
presented affects their personal interests; access all public (and therefore redacted) information 
presented by the prosecution and defense; and "participate in closed and ex parte hearings 
depending on the circumstances."204 For those victims who also have legal representation-
whether individual or common, court-appointed or chosen-their participatory rights can extend 
past procedural ones and include the "questioning of witnesses, experts or the accused."205 
Nevertheless, to some extent, victim participation is at the discretion of the court, which 
must decide whether such participation is appropriate?06 A determination of appropriateness 
must balance the rights of the accused, including the "right to a fair and expeditious trial" with 
the rights of the victims to present their views and concerns when their personal interests are 
affected. 207 The court must also make sure that the burden of proof remains with the prosecutor, 
that the victims do not become like a second prosecutor?08 As such, victims should refrain from 
201 Baumgartner, supra note 153, at 429. 
202 Id 
203 Decision on Victims' Participation (Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Jan. 18,2008. 
204 Jd at~~ 108,110, ll3;Baumgartner,supranote 153, at429-30. 
205 Baumgartner, supra note 153, at 430. 
206 
"The Court shall permit [participation by the victims] at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate 
by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial." Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 68(3). 
207 Cohen, supra note 142, at 371. 
zos Id 
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making factual accusations or independent legal conjectures about the evidence that would 
disturb the prosecution's case or inhibit the accused's defense?09 
Still, even withln what would seem to be a rather limited or restricted manner of 
participation by qualified victims, there is a great deal of potential to influence the outcome of a 
proceeding. An astute victim legal team would particularly tailor its representation to highlight 
the weaker portions of the prosecutor's case, buttress the prosecutor's evidence with strong 
witnesses and evidence of its own, and, depending on the charges, paint for the court a more 
nuanced cultural landscape than the prosecution might need to. The success of this mechanism 
for victim participation-and apparent recognition of the myriad benefits it brings-is evidenced 
by the onslaught of victim applications that swamped the Victims Participation and Reparations · 
Section (VPRS) during the brief window that the court had set in anticipation of the confrrmation 
of charges hearing of Callixte Mbarushimana.210 VPRS strongly requested an extension so that it 
might process the 783 applications it had received, of which 530 seemed to be complete?11 
The victim participation framework is a new mechanism in the accountability process at 
the ICC, but its innovative featur~s have proved appealing to the international community and 
209 Id at 373. 
21
° First transmission to the Pre-Trial Chamber of applications to participate in the proceedings (Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Single Judge), pg. 3/6,4/6, No. ICC-01/04-01/10-166, May 20,2011. Mbarushimana was the ''alleged executive 
secretary of the ... FDLR-FCA," a Rwandan rebel group participating in the conflict in the DRC. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo--JCC-01/04-0J/10, the Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, INT'L CRIM. COURT, 
http://www .icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200 1 04/related%20cases/icc0 104011 0/icc . • 
01040110?lan=en-GB (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). He was ch~ged with the crimes against humanity ofmurder, ; 
torture, rape, inhuman acts, and persecution; and the war crimes of attacks against the civilian population, murder, 
mutilation, torture, rape, inhuman treatment, destruction of property, and pillaging. Jd 
211 First transmission to the Pre-Trial Chamber of applications to participate in the proceedings, No. ICC-01/04-
0 1/10-166, at pg. 3/6. The request was denied. Id at pg. 5/6. On December 16, 2011, the PTC I declined to 
confirm the charges against Mbarushimana and declared his release from ICC custody upon completion of the 
necessary arrangements. Decision on the confrrmation of charges (Pre-Trial Chamber I) pg. 149/150, No. ICC-
Ol/04-0l/10-465~Red, Dec. 16,2011. 
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many victims have applied for victim status in order to avail themselves of the benefits. 212 The 
potential is enormous for victims and their legal representatives to influence at1d enhance the trial 
process. Specifically, there are a great many opportunities during the proceedings to inject into 
the process a different, more culture-oriented perspective. 
Cultural genocide has been somewhat sidelined as a distinct legal concept, even as it has 
been acknowledged as one vvay to prove genocidal intent?13 It has, however, a more versatile 
use in highlighting the cultural background against vvhich conflicts can be analyzed; victim 
participation at the ICC can help to strengthen this cultural context. It is important to note that 
victim participation is not a way to get the crime of cultural genocide back into the Rome Statute 
in its own right. Cultural genocide is substantive law which is not presently contained in the 
Rome Statute; the victim participation mechanism is one procedure that can substantively affect 
the ICC's substantive interpretation of genocide, by infusing culture into the cases. As such, 
victim participation can be an extremely useful and crucial instrument in expressing the 
foundation of the concept that culture is an undeniable and intertwined part of all proceedings by 
reminding the court of past attacks on cultural life, buildings, and artifacts, and the continuing 
decimating effects such acts are having on local culture and identity.214 
In this sense, participation by both natural persons and institutions or organizations will 
allow for slightly different perspectives to be brought forth, and will reinforce different aspects 
of a nation's or group's culture. The legal representatives of the victims would be well-advised 
to take advantage of their unique position within the trial proceedings to advance the charge for 
212 Registry and Trust Fund for Victims Fact Sheet, March 2011, COALITION FORTI-IE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, available at www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documentsNictims_ Factsheet_ March_ 20 11.18apr1832. pdf 
("Since 2005, the [VPRS] has received a total of 4,773 victims' applications for participation and 2,031 for 
reparation" as of March 31, 2011.). 
213 See supra Part II.C.1. 
214 See, e.g., Air strikes and clashes continue in Darfur, RADIO DABANGA (Dec. 27, 2011), 
http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/22943. 
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recognition of cultural destruction as a legitimate consequence and oft-desired result of attacks 
on individuals, villages, and communities. In the absence of any provisions on cultural genocide 
or ethnic cleansing in the Rome Statute-which would require that this type of evidence be 
presented-the victims' legal representatives would be able to supplement the prosecutor's case 
for other crimes215 and heighten awareness of the cultural context in which the events at issue 
occurred. 
IV. Application to the Case against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir 
The victim participation framework, while still fluid, was tested and tried in the first-ever 
case before the ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga?16 Submitted for deliberation in August, in March, 
Trial Chamber I issued the ICC's first-ever verdict, fmding Lubanga guilty of "the war crimes of 
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in 
hostilities."217 The reason why this Comment does not analyze the Lubanga victims' 
participation and instead focuses on the case against Sudanese President al-Bashir-and the 
reason why the al-Bashir case is significant-is because al-Bashir is the only person so far to 
have been indicted for genocide, the crime most sensitive to cultural considerations?18 
A. Charging Bashir with Genocide 
215 It is important to note that the prosecutor cannot charge an accused with cultural genocide because it is not 
contained in the Rome Statute. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 83. She must therefore be careful about 
how to color its genocide allegations-cultural harms can only be used to fortify her case as proof of intent. See 
supra Part II.C.l. 
216 Greco, supra note 139, at 546. 
217 Press Release, Trial Chamber I to Deliberate on the Case Against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-CPI-20110826-
PR714 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media!Press+Releases/ (page 2, 
"26.08.20 11 "). Press Release, ICC First verdict: Thomas Lubanga guilty of conscripting and enlisting children 
under the age of 15 and usmg them to participate in hostilities, ICC-CPI-20120314-PR776 (Mar. 14, 2012), 
available athttp://www.icc-cpi.int!NR/exeres/A70A5D27-18B4-4294-816F-BE68155242EO.htm. 
218 Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (Pre-Trial Chamber I),~~ 23-24, 30--
31,39-40,43, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94, July 12,2010. 
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The pre-trial chamber denied the prosecutor's original request for an arrest warrant for al-
Bashir219 on charges of genocide-by killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and 
deliberately inflicting destructive conditions of life220-on the grounds that, despite the drawing 
of various inferences from the presentation of evidence by the prosecutor, a conclusion of 
genocidal intent by al-Bashir could not be the only reasonable conclusion drawn.221 The 
chamber reasoned that since there were other plausible conclusions-for example, discrimination 
or persecution-there was no specific intent to commit genocide. 222 
The prosecutor appealed the PTC's decision not to issue an arrest warrant on charges of 
genocide-though the chamber did issue one for various war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 223 The appeals chamber determined that the PTC had applied the incorrect standard 
for determining genocidal intent (at least for the arrest warrant stage), and that the proper 
standard is that only one of the reasonable conclusions derived from the evidence presented need 
be genocidal intent.224 Upon remand, the PTC determined that the inferences from the evidence 
219 Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir is the President of the Republic of Sudan; he has been in power since 1993. 
Darfur, Sudan--JCC-02/05-01/09, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir, INT'L.CRIM. COURT, 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/icc 
020501 09?lan=en-GB (last visited Jan. 20, 20 12). He is alleged to be at the head of a Government of Sudan 
counter-insurgency campaign "to unlawfully attack ... the [Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa] civilian population of 
Darfur'' as part of the conflict against the SLM/A, JEM, and other militia groups, which are composed of members 
of those tribes. Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir, p. 5/8, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 4 March 
2009. As such, he is charged with the crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, 
and rape; the war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual 
civilians not taking part in hostilities, and pillaging; and genocide by killing, by causing serious bodily or mental 
harm, and by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's 
physical destruction. ld at p. 7/8, 8/8; Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 
No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94 at pg. 28/30. 
220 Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at articles 6(a)-(c). 
221 Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir (Pre-
Trial Chamber I),~~ 159, 205, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Mar. 4, 2009. 
222 Jd at~ 167. 
223 Id at pg. 92/95; Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir," (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-12, 
Mar. 13, 2009. 
224 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant 
of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir'' (Appeals Chamber),~~ 30, 39, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73, Feb. 3, 
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did lead to a reasonable potential conclusion of genocidal intent and issued a second warrant of 
arrest for Bashir for charges of genocide by killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and 
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction?25 
In its analysis of genocide and the intent necessary to warrant charges, the PTC made a 
distinction between genocidal intent and what it called persecutory intent (or the intent to 
"discriminate on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other 
grounds").226 Both require dolus specialis, or specific intent, but the objectives of the intention 
behind the targeting are different?27 One is the intent to destroy in whole or in part; the other is 
intent to discriminate?28 Such a distinction is highlighted in analysis of policies of ethnic 
cleansing.229 Ethnic cleansing does not necessarily result in the destruction of a people; genocide 
is not the "automatic consequence" of forcible displacement policies?30 As noted above, ethnic 
cleansing by itself is not considered a genocidal policy; it can only be considered as evidence of 
genocidal intent.231 "Genocide, [however,] is an extreme and most inhuman form of 
persecution" and ethnic cleansing.232 This means that it may be the case that a policy of ethnic 
2010 (emphasis added). There is a multi-tiered approach within the Rome Statue for the burden of proof to be met 
by the prosecutor during various stages of the trial: for the issuance of an arrest warrant, "reasonable grounds to 
believe" suffices. Jd at~ 30. This is heightened to ~~substantial grounds to believe" for the confrrmation of charges 
hearing.Jd; Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at article 61(7). The fmal threshold to be met for conviction is "beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir," No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73 at~ 30; 
Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 66(3). 
225 Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, No. ICC-02/05-01109-94 at~~ 4-5; 
Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), pg. 8/9, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-
95, July 12, 2010. 
226 Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir, No. 
ICC-02/05-01/09-3 at~ 141. 
227 Jd 
228 Jd. 
229 Sirkin, supra note 10, at 505-09. 
230 Jd. at~ 144 (quoting Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. 7, ~ 190 (Feb. 26), [hereinafter ICJ 
Judgment on Genocide]. 
231 See supra Part II.C.2. 
232 Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir, No. 
ICC-02/05-01/09-3 at~ 142 (quoting ICJ Judgment on Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. 7 at 1188). 
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cleansing or persecution escalates into genocide; if the objective elements are met along with the 
specific intent, such policies may reach the level of prosecutable genocide?33 
Al~Bashir is not charged with the crime against humanity of persecution,234 but elements 
of what would be evidence of persecution may be used as evidence of genocide and genocidal 
intent because the difference is one of degree.235 That does not mean, however, that such 
evidence would be sufficient on its own.236 On the contrary, it would need to be accompanied by 
direct or indirect evidence of, for example, a strategy to "deny and conceal the crimes" being 
committed against the targeted groups; official statements and documents referencing or 
providing inferences of a genocidal policy, whether already in existence or in formation; and 
"the nature and extent of the acts of violence" being committed.237 Proving al-Bashir's specific 
intent to commit genocide, required for a conviction of genocide, is going to be extremely 
difficult for the prosecutor, as was evidenced by the PTC's initial rejection of the prosecutor's 
request for an arrest warrant on charges of genocide (despite its initial application of the 
incorrect standard). 238 
In its impugned first decision on the application for the arrest warrant, the PTC pointed to 
the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Decision on Genocide that analyzed whether genocide 
had been committed anywhere else outside of Srebrenica during the Yugoslav wars?39 The ICJ 
found that despite 
the mass killings of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians 
and prisoners of war; the mass rapes of tens of thousands of 
Bosnian Muslim civilian women; the deportation and forcible 
233 Jd at~~ 142, 145. 
234 See id. 
235 !d. at~~ 142-43. 
236 !d. at~ 145. 
237 I d. at ~ 164. 
238 See Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a PI arrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 
No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3. 
239 Jd at~ 194. 
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displacement of hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslim 
civilians; the widespread and systematic beatings, torture and 
inhumane treatment (malnutrition and poor health conditions) in 
dozens of detention camps throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
the siege of Bosnian Muslim civilians in cities through Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, such as Sarajevo, where shelling, sniping and 
starvation by hindering humanitarian aid was a matter of course; 
and the destruction of cultural, religious and historical property in 
an attempt to wipe out traces of the existence of the Bosnian-
Muslim group from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
such evidence was insufficient to support an inference of genocidal intent by Bosnian-Serb 
leadership.240 The chamber then compared the evidence that had been presented to the ICJ in the 
Bosnia genocide case with that which had been presented to the ICC chamber in the Bashlr 
genocide case, namely that the Government of Sudan forces had 
carried out numerous unlawful attacks, followed by systematic acts 
of pillage, on towns and villages, mainly inhabited by civilians 
belonging to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups; subjected 
thousands of civilians, belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa groups to acts of murder, as well as acts of 
extermination; subjected thousands of civilian women, belonging 
primarily to the said groups to acts of rape; subjected hundreds of 
thousands of civilians belonging primarily to the said groups to 
acts of forcible transfer; and subjected civilians belonging 
primarily to the said groups to acts of torture, 
and found that while such evidence strongly supported a fmding of the commission of serious 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could not be extended to a finding of the commission 
of genocide (or a fmding ofthe specific intent for genocide)?41 
Of the evidence presented by the prosecutor to show genocidal intent, the only reference 
to any kind of cultural destruction was the "unlawful arrest of community leaders and [their] 
subsequent mistreatment/torture" at the hands of the former members of the Sudanese secret 
240 I d. at ~ 194 (emphasis added). 
241 Id at~~ 192-93. 
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police?42 Since the prosecutor is going to be fighting an increasingly uphill battle in proving 
genocide as the trial process proceeds, he should use every possible method to bolster his case 
for showing specific intent. This includes evidence of ethnic cleansing, persecution and cultural 
destruction. 
B. Using Culture to Prove the Specific Intent of Genocide in Darfur 
The insertion of a cultural perspective into the future proceedings of the case against 
Sudanese President al-Bashir is not only going to be a useful exercise, but also an imperative 
one. The media has been hesitant to call the violence occurring in Darfur, raging since 2003, a 
genocide.243 The first high-profile political actor to bra11d Darfur a genocide was then-U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2004, who presented to the U.N. and to the U.S. Congress the 
fmdings of a U.S. Department of State report?44 Powell's testimony was immediately followed 
by an official statement from former President George W. Bush.245 In fact, most countries and 
organizations have shied away from labeling the atrocities a genocide, sticking instead to the 
lesser designation of crimes against humanity?46 The U.S., as well, later backpedaled on its 
statements. 247 
1. The Spectre of the Holocaust 
242 Jd at~ 178. 
243 See generally Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, supra note 12, at 79-93. 
244 The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., supra note 11, at 11 ("When we 
reviewed the evidence ... we concluded, I concluded, that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the 
Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility-and that genocide may still be occurring .... "). 
245 Hagan & Rymond-Ricbmond, supra note 12, at 80 ("As a result of [Secretary Powell's team of investigators] we 
have concluded that genocide has taken place in Darfur. We urge the international community to work with us to 
prevent and suppress acts of genocide. We call on the United Nations to undertake a full investigation of the 
genocide and other crimes in Darfur.") (quoting Office of the Press Secretary, President's Statement on Violence in 
Darfur, Sudan, Sept. 9, 2004, available at http:l/georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040909-1 O.html). 
246 Mai-Linh K. Hong, Note, A Genocide by Any Other Name: Language, Law, and the Response to Darfur, 49 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 235,237-38 (2008). 
247 See Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, supra note 12, at 85-93. 
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The main reason for such an aversion to the use of the term is the fact that the inspiration 
behind the Genocide Convention-and the clearest, most unequivocal example of genocide to 
date-was the Holocaust; the 'genocides' occurring in today's world do not and will not look 
anything like the Holocaust.248 Thus because Darfur doesn't look and feel like Europe in the 
1940s, it cannot actually be a true or real genocide.249 Such a comparison is absurd and counter-
productive-how many people must die and in what manner with how much governmental 
documentation before the world calls it genocide? One of the legacies of the Holocaust was the 
thousands of laws, orders, and documents (including diary entriesi50 that systematically and in 
great detail illustrated the evolution of the Nazi's "gigantic scheme to change, in favor of 
Germany, the balance of biological forces between it and the captive nations for many years to 
come."251 The Nuremberg Tribunal used this evidence to conclude that the crime against 
humanity with which the first set of defendants was charged (under which genocide was 
subsumed) "ha[ d] been proved in the greatest detail."252 
248 Hong, supra note 246, at 261. 
249 
"If this is a genocide, it doesn't look very much like those we've known before." Scott Anderson, How Did 
Darfur Happen?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, § 6 (Magazine) at 52, 56, available at 
http://nytimes.com/2004/1 0/17 /magainze/17DARFUR.html. 
250 Schabas, supra note 13, at 39 (Hans Frank testified before the Nuremberg Tribunal in his own defense and said, 
"[W]e have allowed ourselves to make utterances and my own diary has become a witness against me in this 
connection .... "). 
251 Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi. Lemkin's book contains hundreds of pages of painstakingly analyzed and 
transcribed laws, orders, decrees, acts, proclamations, and instructions that underpinned the Nazi policies. See id at 
xvii-xxxviii [Contents]. 
252 France et al. v. Goering et al., 22 IMT 203, 408 (1946). There were twenty-three defendants, among whom 
perhaps the most infamous was Hermann Wilhelm Goering. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR 
PROSECUTION OF AxiS CRil\IIINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION (VOL. 1) lli (1946). Some of the 
documents relied on by the Tribunal included "the personal and official correspondence of Alfred Rosenberg, 
together with a great quantity of Nazi Party correspondence;" '~thirty-nine leather-bound volumes containing 
detailed inventories of the art treasures of Europe that had been looted;" "485 tons of crated papers [which 
contained] the records of the German Foreign Office from 1837 to 1944;" and over "300 creates of German High 
Command files, 85 notebooks containing minutes from Hitler's conferences, and the complete files of the German 
Navy." ld at vi. 
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It is true that in Darfur, there is no "absolutely clear, well-documented intent to 
destroy."253 There are "[n]o public proclamations about 'the enemy within,' no extermination 
lists."254 "Instead, it is shadowy, informal; the killing takes place offstage. It is the destruction 
of a people in a place where it is virtually impossible to distinguish incompetence from 
conspiracy. Is that by design, the sheer evil genius of it all, or just more evidence of a 
government's utter haplessness?"255 Thus the fundamental question is whether there can be 
genocide -vvhere "there has never been a stable, technocratic regime or a bureaucracy to plan, 
execute, and document an orderly mass killing. "256 Or perhaps the more pertinent question 
would be, in light of the condemnatory nature of the German official records, whether there will 
ever be another genocide with such an obvious paper trail. The answer would seem to be no. 
The representatives present during the drafting of the Genocide Convention wanted to include a 
requirement for government involvement in the definition of genocide, but did not.257 Therefore, 
while as a general rule the government is usually complicit in the commission of genocide, it is 
not beyond the scope of interpretation that the definition could be applied to genocide occurring 
without any governmental oversight. 258 Even putting that aside, there will be nary a government 
that would risk enacting laws or publishing decrees that would enumerate genocidal policies. 
This Comment will assume that for the purposes of the following analysis, genocide can 
indeed occur under circumstances where there seems to be little or no coordination with the 
government. Of course, "without documentation produced by a state bureaucracy with a 
253 Hong, supra note 246, at 262. 
254 Anderson, supra note 249. 
255 Jd 
256 Hong, supra note 246, at 262. 
257 Schabas, supra note 13, at 65. 
258 Id Nevertheless, this restriction on the definition was left out largely due to "practical difficulties." !d. (quoting 
U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, pg. 6). 
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genocidal mission, the burden of proving intent is great."259 The PTC acknowledged as much 
when it concluded that, inter alia, the paucity of official statements from the Government of 
Sudan was insufficient to lead to a conclusion that genocidal intent was the only reasonable 
inference drawn from the evidence.260 It therefore becomes crucial for the cultural context in 
which the violence has taken place to be vividly painted for the trial chamber so that the chamber 
can make the determination that while Darfur does not bear the same features as the Holocaust, it 
could also be a genocide. The legal representatives of the victims are uniquely situated to take 
on this important task, as they have the most direct and sustained contact with Darfuris (either on 
the ground, as internally-displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees). 
2. Cultural Life in Darfur 
The territory of Darfur-meaning "Land of the Fur"-is in West Sudan and is 
approximately the size of France?61 It is home to anywhere from forty to ninety tribes, who are 
primarily identified both internally and externally as either Arab or non-Arab.262 The three main 
non-Arab tribes, the tribes almost exclusively targeted by Sudanese military forces and the 
Janjaweed militia,263 are the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.264 They speak Arabic, as it is the lingua 
franca of the country, but also maintain their tribal languages, which play very important roles in 
259 Hong, supra note 246, at 262. 
260 Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir (Pre-
Trial Chamber I), 1 165, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Mar. 4, 2009. 
261 Hong, supra note 246, at 244; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY 
GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN 5 VOL. 16:6(A) (May 2004) [hereinafter Darfur Destroyed]. 
262 MEENU MENON, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DARFUR: THE CULTURE AND THE PEOPLE, available at 
http://rhin.org/documents/DARFUR_THE_ CUL TURE_AND _THE_PEOPLE_English.pdf(last visited Nov. 7, 
2011). 
263 The Janjaweed are informally organized Arab militias, who have joined with the Sudanese government in 
attacking the Darfuri tribes. Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, supra note 12, at 108. The translation of"Janjaweed" is 
"evil [or devil] on horseback." Rebecca Leung, Witnessing Genocide In Sudan, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11,2009, 7:49 
PM), http://www .cbsnews.com/stories/2004/1 0/08/60minutes/main648277 .shtml. 
264 Menon, supra note 262. 
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passing down histories, stories, and culture by way of oral tradition.265 Each tribe also has its 
own customs, traditions, and religious beliefs, the hybridization of which creates the overarching, 
all-encompassing Darfuri culture?66 Still, each tribe protects its own personalized part of the 
culture, with art forms, dances, and celebrations.267 
The tribal village is traditionally based on kinship and a sense of familial community, as 
most of the people living in the village are related to each other.268 Every Darfuri tribe and its 
culture is very closely attached to its la.L""'ld, which has sustained it for centuries.269 Each village 
has a central meeting area called the dara, where villagers eat meals, socialize, resolve disputes, 
and discuss the news. 270 The children of the village are also schooled in the dar a, learning their 
tribal history, genealogy, and culture from their grandparents, particularly their grandmothers?71 
Special religious scholars also hold sessions for villagers to learn and read the Quran?72 These 
scholars, along with the tribal village chief and the traditional healers (whose vocation is passed 
down from generation to generation), are the most important members of the community and are 
highly respected. 
3. Effect of the Violence on Cultural Life 
The widespread atrocities occurring in Darfur have certainly not gone unnoticed and 
there is much documentation detailing the violence. 273 One of the most comprehensive reports 
265 Jd 
266 Jd 
267 Jd 
268 Jd 
269 Jd 
270 Menon, supra note 262. 
271 Jd 
272 Jd 
273 Reports have been compiled by the UN, governments, and non-governmental organizations. See Hagan & 
Rymond-Richmond, supra note 12, at xvii-xx, 3 (The Atrocities Documentation Survey conducted by the U.S. State 
Department); Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-
General [hereinafter Darfur Report], delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 31, 2005); 
Darfur Destroyed, supra note 261. 
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of the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law being committed in Darfur 
is contained in the "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
Secretary-General" ("Darfur Report"), the compilation of which was authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council in Resolution 1564 in September 2004.274 The Commission requested, and 
received, materials from various sources "including Governments, intergovernmental 
organizations, various United Nations mechanisms or bodies, non-governmental 
organizations" and "international and regional organizations."275 Most of the information 
contained in the reports that flooded the Commission was based on witness interviews, though 
some was also gleaned from satellite imagery (to trace destruction of, and attacks on, villages) 
and field visits?76 
Despite the fact that the Commission did not find sufficient evidence to justify a 
conclusion that genocide was being committed,277 there is much to support such a finding once 
the cultural nuances are properly taken into account. In reviewing all of the materials sent to the 
Commission, it reported "hundreds of incidents ... involving the killing of civilians, massacres, 
summary executions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, abduction, looting of 
property and livestock, as well as deliberate destruction and torching of villages."278 The 
villages are left "burned, completely or partially, with only shells of outer walls of the traditional 
circular houses left standing[, with w ]ater pumps and wells ... destroyed, implements for food 
processing wrecked, [and] trees and crops burned and cut down."279 But it is not just the villages 
274 Darfur Report, supra note 273, at pg. 2. 
275 ld. at~ 182. 
276 Id. at~ 183. 
277 
"There is no doubt that some of the objective elements of genocide materialized in Darfur .... However, ... 
other ... elements ... show a lack of genocidal intent. ... On the basis of the foregoing observations, the 
Commission concludes that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide." Jd. at~~ 507,513, 
518. 
278 Id at~ 186. 
279 I d. at~ 235. 
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and rural areas being attacked-towns and cities are not immune either.280 Many towns "show 
signs of damage to homes and essential infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and police 
stations."281 
Another comprehensive report is "Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government 
and Militia Forces in Western Sudan," compiled independently by Human Rights Watch (HRW); 
the report is the result of a twenty-five day field mission by members ofHRW into Darfur.282 In 
addition to many of the same findings of bombings, mass and summary killings, and rape, HR W 
also found "systematic destruction of mosques and the desecration of articles of Islam."283 
Government forces and the Janjaweed militia "have killed imams[, second imams, and 
muezzins], destroyed mosques and prayer mats, [and] torn up and defecated on Qorans."284 
Such arbitrary and disproportionate violence has led to "massive displacement of large 
parts of the civilian population within Darfur and to neighboring Chad."285 The severity and 
repetition of attacks against the same or surrounding villages often spread fear throughout the 
area, leading entire villages to evacuate and flee to more relatively safe areas. 286 At the time that 
the Darfur Commission submitted its report to the U.N.-2005-the estimate for refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) numbered around 1.2 million, with over 700 villages 
destroyed.287 Those in the IDP camps do not fare any better, being akin to "virtual prisoners."288 
They are ''confined to camps and settlements with inadequate food, shelter and humanitarian 
280 Darfur Report, supra note 273, at ,-r 235 
281 Jd 
282 Darfur Destroyed, supra note 261, at 2. 
283 Jd at 27. 
284 Jd at 28. 
285 Jd 
286 Darfur Report, supra note 273, at~ 186. 
287 Id at~~ 226, 236. 
288 Jd at~ 196. 
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assistance, at constant risk of further attacks, rape and looting of their remaining possessions."289 
The displaced do not want to stay in the camps, yet they fear even more returning to their homes 
because of the probability of more attacks, attacks occurring with impunity against the 
civilians?90 In addition, members of the Janjaweed sometimes "camp" in the villages they have 
burned, thus ensuring that its inhabitants do not return. 291 From these makeshift bases, the 
Janjaweed "mount . . . raids across the border into Chad and exert . . . some control over the 
movement of displaced persons. Their mere presence close to the border ensure[s] that refugees 
in Chad [do] not attempt to cross back into Darfur to salvage buried grain or other 
belongings. "292 
The destruction of entire villages' and communities' ways of life is undeniably having a 
profound impact on local tribal culture. HR W concluded in its report that the human rights 
violations it witnessed "amount[ed] to a government policy of ~ethnic cleansing' of certain ethnic 
groups, namely the Fur and the Masalit, from their areas of residence."293 Ethnic cleansing, 
which has a cultural element to it, is also evidence of a genocidal policy.294 Civilians are being 
subjected to "attacks directed against [them], the burning of their villages, the mass killings of 
persons under their control, the forced displacement of populations, the destruction of their food 
stocks, livelihoods and the looting of their livestock by government and militia forces," the 
mistreatment, arrest, imprisonment, and torture of their tribal chiefs, and the violation and 
289 ld For example, Kalma camp, located in South Darfur near the city ofNyala, is facing dire food and water 
shortages. Radio Dabanga, Sudan: Food and Water Shortage in Kalma Camp, ALL AFRJCA, Nov. 1, 2011, 
http:/ /allafrica.com/stories/20 1111021 026.html. The humanitarian coordinator for the camp said that the camp has 
not received food for two months, and they are low on fuel so they cannot run the water pumps. Id He accused the 
Sudanese government of intentionally restricting the delivery of supplies to the camp. ld 
290 Darfur Report, supra note 273, at~ 197. 
291 Darfur Destroyed, supra note 261, at 34. 
292 Id 
293 Id at 39. 
294 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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destruction of their religious buildings and objects?95 These hardships are wrenching the tightly 
knit and kinship-based tribes from their land and family members apart. Once they are forced 
off their land, these bonds are further eroded at the IDP camps, which are in unenviable 
humanitarian condition, and are themselves subject to more attacks.296 All of these actions have 
the cumulative effect of destroying the cultural ties that bind the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
tribes. 
C. Linking Cultural Destruction to Proving Genocide 
Being able to accurately and prominently depict this cultural state of affairs for the trial 
chamber at the ICC will have profound consequences for the prosecution of Sudanese President 
al-Bashir for genocide. The legal representatives of the victims should seize the opportunity to 
increase the role that they play at the ICC-within the modalities of participation that the court 
has granted them, of course. This is important to note; there are limitations to the role that 
victims can play?97 They can only use the methods of participation that are specified by the 
statute and authorized by the court?98 Nevertheless, by complementing the evidence that the 
prosecutor will be presenting, the representative of the victims can help to buttress his argument 
for genocide, by helping to show two elements of the crime of genocide: the first is whether the 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes fall under the four enumerated "protected groups;" the second is 
whether there was a specific intent to commit genocide. 299 
Scholars have thoroughly dealt with the first element, on the status of the three tribes as 
protected groups under the Genocide Convention, elsewhere and it will not be re-analyzed 
295 Darfur Destroyed, supra note 261, at 40. 
296 Darfur Report, supra note 273, at~ 327. Women in particular are in danger of rape at the camps. ld 
297 See Cohen, supra note 142, at 352-55. 
298 Baumgartner, supra note 153, at 425. 
299 See supra Part II.C and !J.D. 
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here.300 The second, however, has not. The PTC, in denying a warrant of arrest for al-Bashir for 
genocide due to lack of specific intent, noted that the documents and official statements that the 
prosecutor submitted as evidence of such intent could just as easily be proof of discrimination or 
persecution. 301 What will help to support those documents will be a strong showing of 
persecution and ethnic cleansing policies pursued by the joint and separate attacks by the 
Sudanese military forces and the Janjaweed militia. 
In fact, there is such evidence to be found suggesting that the intent of the Government of 
Sudan and its proxies, the Janjaweed militia, is to destroy, whether in its entirety or partially, the 
non-Arab tribes of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. 302 The powerful findings of the clear 
commission of the crime against humanity of persecution, 303 the crime against humanity of 
extermination,304 and the undeniable ethnic cleansing305 taking place (primarily through forced 
displacement and forcible transfer) attest to this. Persecution and ethnic cleansing are both 
policies on a sliding scale of specific intent, and their coupling provides at least a strong 
argument that those policies are genocidal. 306 
Of the three types of genocide with which the prosecutor has charged al-Bashir-
genocide by killing, genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and genocide by 
300 See, e.g., Hong, supra note 246. 
301 Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir (Pre-
Trial Chamber I),~ 167, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Mar. 4, 2009. 
302 Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (Pre-Trial Chamber I),~ 5, No. ICC-
02/05-01/09-94, July 12, 2010. 
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deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction307-the 
one most amenable to cultural buttressing as fu"1:iculated above is the final one. The shattering of 
entire communities and villages forcing displacement into camps, which are not safe from attack 
either, is wrenching apart the strong cultural bonds between tribal members and forcing them 
from the land they have occupied and claimed for hundreds of years. 308 In addition to atrocious 
living conditions, the loss of their support system, cultural histories and genealogies, and 
traditional forms of livelihood is straining the identity of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.309 
As Raphael Lemkin stated in his seminal articulation of genocide, the destruction of the 
foundational elements of the life of national groups is the means by which to annihilate the 
groups themselves.310 Accordingly, culture, and the impact that the violence in Darfur is having 
on it, vvill play a very important role in the prosecution for genocide. By incorporating numerous 
and powerful references to the culture of the tribes and the disastrous consequences of the 
attacks, the legal representatives of the victims will be able to help develop modem genocide 
jurisprudence, leaving behind the more structured example of the Holocaust,311 and bringing to 
justice potentially one of the savviest (or most "hapless"312) perpetrators of genocide the world 
has ever seen. 
V. Conclusion 
The creation of the Genocide Convention following the horrors of World War II was a 
missed opportunity for the international community to criminalize the intentional destruction, ''in 
307 While the one provision of the defmition of cultural genocide was included in the Rome Statute-that of forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group-and as such would be the greatest beneficiary of cultural 
context, al~Bashir is not charged with genocide by forcible transfer of children. 
308 Menon, supra note 262. 
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310 See supra Part I and II.A. 
311 See supra Part IV.B.l. 
312 Hong, supra note 246, at 261. 
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whole or in part," of a nation's culture and identity-cultural genocide.313 While the first two 
drafts contained strong provisions for the protection of culture and its tangible manifestations, 
the final result contained none.314 Subsequent events in the world, namely the wars in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, forced the international community to rethink its position on the 
complete absence of cultural genocide as a legal concept. The ICTY's jurisprudence carved out 
a niche for the use of cultural genocide as one method for contributing to the showing of specific 
intent for the conviction of traditional genocide. 315 
The establishment of the ICC, a permanent institution dedicated to the pursuance of 
accountability and justice of perpetrators of international criminal law violations, briefly 
reopened debate about whether to incorporate cultural genocide as a separate crime in its 
founding statute.316 Despite the fact that the international community declined to do so, the 
statute does contain a unique and revolutionary provision: it provides for the legal representation 
of certified victims before the court, in a capacity comparable to a third party in a case.317 Some 
modes of participation are proscribed for those representatives, but they are nevertheless allowed 
to engage in many of the same proceedings, and participate within them, as the prosecution and 
the defense. This novel mechanism has the potential to inject cultural recognition and awareness 
into the trials, as the representatives will have the closest contact with the victims who 
experienced the attacks, and will have as great an interest in securing convictions for genocide as 
the prosecutor. 
The case against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is the perfect test case for the use of 
victim participation as a means of getting evidence of cultural genocide in as evidence of 
313 See Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 5. 
314 See supra Part II.A. 
315 See supra Part II.C.l. 
316 See supra Part II.D. 
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genocidal intent, as contemplated and acknowledged by the ICTY?18 The attacks and 
destruction on tribal villages in Darfur are ripping communities apart and uprooting centuries-old 
villages that have strong ties to the land and surrounding area. The killing of civilians, arrest, 
and torture of tribal chiefs, and herding of the survivors into camps for the internally-displaced is 
only continuing to threaten the tribal identities of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.319 The 
prosecution is going to have a difficult enough time as it is to prove genocide because of the 
dearth of concrete documentary evidence of specific intent to destroy. It ·would behoove the 
legal representatives of the victims to take advantage of their unique position within the legal 
structure of t~e court to fervently press to the court the cultural context in which the violence is 
occurring, and urge that without such a context-and because the events in Darfur do not 
resemble what is considered the epitome of genocide, the Holocaust320-the genocidal attacks 
occurring cannot be properly interpreted and justice cannot be served.321 
318 See supra Part IV.A. 
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